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THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP:
EXPERIMENTAL USE OF PATENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA
OFER TUR-SIVAi
As the secret negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement ("TPP") between the United States and eleven other
nations advance, the recent release of the draft Intellectual
Property Chapter provides a timely opportunity to examine its
content. Among the myriad issues addressed in the draft is
experimental use of patents, a topic that has been the source of
much discussion and debate in recent years. This Article analyzes
the proposed Experimental Use Clause and evaluates it in light of
the policy considerations underlying the patent system.
The analysis demonstrates that adoption of an international
standard concerning experimental use ofpatents can have significant
benefits in promoting uniformity and removing uncertainty. However,
a close examination of the proposed Experimental Use Clause
reveals that it falls short of attaining these goals due to a few
notable shortcomings. First, the clause is drafted in a permissive
manner, and thus, may end up having little impact on the laws of
the member nations. Second, it does not provide guidance with
respect to key doctrinal questions related to the application of the
experimental use exception. Finally, the clause is drafted in too
narrow a manner, and fails to include in its scope the important
scenario of patented research tools used for the purpose offollow-
.Ofer Tur-Sinai is a Lecturer at Ono Academic College (Israel). He would
like to thank Miriam Bitton, Michal Shur-Ofry and Peter Yu, as well as the
participants of the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at University of
Califronia Berkeley School of Law (2014), for their helpful comments,
suggestions, and discussions. Certain comparative law aspects of the research
were carried out at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law in Lausanne, and the
author would like to thank the staff of the Institute, particularly Alberto




on research and development. Thus, rather than facilitating the
adoption of broad exceptions by member nations in an attempt to
create a global legal environment supportive of cumulative
research and development, the proposed Experimental Use Clause
may actually have the opposite effect. The Article concludes with a
proposal to revise the Experimental Use Clause in order to remedy
its deficiencies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On November 13, 2013, WikiLeaks released the newest draft
of the Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (the "IP Chapter") of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement ("TPP").' The TPP is a
proposed regional free trade agreement negotiated in secrecy
between Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United
States and Vietnam.2 Touted as one of the largest free trade
agreements in the history of the United States,' the TPP aims to
achieve broad Asia-Pacific regional economic integration.'
1Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) - IP Chapter, WIKILEAKS
(November 13, 2013), https://wikileaks.org/tpp/pressrelease.html [hereinafter
WikiLeaks Release]. For the draft of the IP Chapter, see https://wikileaks.org/tpp/
[hereinafter IP Chapter].
2 The TPP is essentially an expanded version of the 2005 Trans-Pacific
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand
and Singapore. IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 1 (Dec. 12, 2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40502.pdf.
See BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42322, TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP (TPP) COUNTRIES: COMPARATIVE TRADE AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, (June 10, 2013), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42344.pdf
("The TPP would be the largest U.S. FTA to date by trade value."); Mireya
Solis, Endgame: Challenges for the United States in finalizing the TPP
Negotiations, 622 KOKUSAI MONDAI (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS) 1, (June 14,
2013), available at http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/publication/2013-06 004-
kokusaimondai.pdf (describing the TPP as "the single most important trade
negotiation under way [sic] for the United States"); Mark Weisbrot, The Trans-
Pacific Partnership Treaty is the Complete Opposite of 'Free Trade',
GUARDIAN, (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
nov/i 9/trans-pacific-partnership-corporate-usurp-congress ("The proposed Trans-
Pacific Partnership agreement [...] [is] one of the largest 'free trade'
agreements in US history.").
4 The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/fact-sheets/20 11/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership;
see Krista L. Cox, The United States' Demands for Intellectual Property
Enforcement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and Impacts for
Developing Countries (Knowledge Ecology International Working Paper 2012),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2188029 ("The goal of the [TPP]
agreement is to cover the entire APEC region, comprising [of] 40% of the
worlds' population.").
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Recently, the TPP has been the target of growing criticism focused
on both the secret nature of the negotiations' and the content of
certain controversial provisions in leaked drafts.
The IP Chapter, in particular, became the source of much
debate after an earlier release of the United States' proposal for
such a chapter (the "U.S. Proposal"),' followed by the recent
release of the current draft by WikiLeaks. The IP Chapter has been
termed "the most controversial chapter of the TPP."' Overall, it has
been criticized as providing an excessive intellectual property
protection that goes well beyond the standards reflected in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (the "TRIPS Agreement")9 and other international
5 See, e.g, Analysis of the Draft Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, CENTRE FOR LAW AND DEMOCRACY 2-6 (December 2013), http://
www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/TPP.IP-final.Decl3.pdf
[hereinafter Centre for Law and Democracy Analysis] (criticizing the secret
nature of the TPP negotiations). On May 23, 2012, United States Senator Ron
Wyden introduced a bill to require the United States Trade Representative to
disclose its TPP documents to all members of Congress. The bill was never
enacted. Congressional Oversight Over Trade Negotiations Act, S. 3225, 112th
Cong. (2012)
6 See Connor Adams Sheets, How to Fight the Trans-Pacific Partnership:
Anti-TPP Petitions, Protests & Campaigns, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-fight-trans-pacific-partnership-
anti-tpp-petitions-protests-campaigns- 1475530 ("A number of petitions, protests
and campaigns have been organized to let citizens voice their concerns about the
agreement, and perhaps even stop it from moving forward as currently
written."). Notably, among such problematic provisions is a clause granting
foreign corporations the power to challenge legislation in a privately run
international court. See, e.g., Zach Carter, Obama Faces Backlash Over New
Corporate Powers in Secret Trade Deal, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 8, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/08/tpp-trade-agreement n 4409211 .html
(describing international criticism towards the political power given to foreign
corporations in sovereign nations under the agreement to contest litigation in a
privately-run international court).
Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft (Feb.
10, 2011), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb20l1-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Proposal].
8 WikiLeaks Release, supra note 1.
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter the TRIPS
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instruments governing the IP arena." In essence, the TPP is what is
commonly termed a "TRIPS-plus" agreement." Among other
things, as currently drafted, the IP Chapter would require party
nations to lengthen copyright terms;12 make the availability of safe
harbors for internet service providers contingent on their
implementation of various measures beyond the standard notice-
and-takedown regime;" bolster patent protection in various
Agreement]. The TRIPS Agreement is Annex IC of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.
10 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that certain proposed measures go
well beyond the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement); see also Peter K. Yu,
The Non-Multilateral Approach to International Intellectual Property
Normsetting 2 (2013) (observing that economic partnership agreements and free
trade agreements in the IP arena generally include IP standards that go beyond
what is required by the TRIPS Agreement or other international agreements
administered by WIPO), reprinted in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Daniel J. Gervais ed., forthcoming 2014),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2325766; Sean M. Flynn, Brook Baker, Margot
Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property
Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV
105, 119 (2012) (maintaining that the U.S. proposal for the IP Chapter, if
adopted, "would heighten standards of protection for rights holders well beyond
that which the best available evidence or inclusive democratic processes
support").
" The term "TRIPS-plus" is used to describe international instruments that
seek to impose legal standards for intellectual property rights protection that
exceed the baseline requirements of the TRIPS Agreement. See, e.g., Kenneth L.
Port, A Case Against the ACTA, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1131, 1154-55 (2012);
Yu, supra note 10, at 2 ("[T]he intellectual property provisions in these so-called
'TRIPS-plus agreements' often mandate protections in excess of the levels
required by the TRIPS Agreement and other international intellectual property
agreements.").
12 Australia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Singapore and the United States have
proposed standardizing copyright protection terms to match their domestic
standards (one hundred years after the death of the creator, under the Mexican
proposal, and seventy years after the death of the creator, under the proposal
supported by Australia, Chile, Peru, Singapore and the United States). IP
Chapter, supra note 1, art. QQ.G.6. For a critical analysis of this proposed
provision, see Centre for Law and Democracy, supra note 5, at 10-12.
13 See IP Chapter, supra note 1, art. QQ.I.L. For a critical analysis of the
proposed arrangements in this context, see Centre for Law and Democracy,
supra note 5, at 6-8.
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manners; 4 and strengthen enforcement mechanisms." In light of
the above, critics of the TPP have expressed concern that, if
instated, the IP Chapter would result in decreasing access to
low-cost medicine;' 6 restricting certain basic uses of the internet;
and, more generally, shifting the balance between IP rights holders
and the public far to the side of rights holders.'" The provisions of
the TPP are expected to be particularly harmful for developing
countries. '
Without undermining the significance of the aforementioned
critiques of the IP Chapter, this Article focuses on yet another
proposed arrangement that so far has not gained any attention by
academic scholars or other critics of the TPP: Article E.5ter,
entitled "Experimental Use of a Patent" (the "Experimental Use
Clause").2 0 This Article conducts a thorough examination of the
Experimental Use Clause against the relevant policy considerations.
As detailed below, rather than criticizing the Experimental Use
Clause, this Article views its inclusion in the IP Chapter of the TPP
as a commendable opportunity to set a clear standard in this
important context. Yet, this Article also recommends certain
14 See IP Chapter, supra note 1, § E. For a critical analysis of the
arrangements proposed by the United States in this context, see Flynn et al.,
supra note 10, at 150-86.
See IP Chapter, supra note 1, § H; Centre for Law and Democracy, supra
note 5, at 12; Cox, supra note 4, at 45.
16 See, e.g., Flynn et al., supra note 10, at 153 (noting that the patent
provisions proposed by the United States "would have predictable negative
effects on the availability of affordable medicines in developing countries").
17 See, e.g., Centre for Law and Democracy, supra note 5, at 6-7.
18 See Flynn et al., supra note 10, at 119 (noting that the IP Chapter, as
proposed by the U.S., "contains insufficient balancing provisions for users,
consumers, and the public interest"); Cox, supra note 4, at 45 (expressing
concern that the enforcement provisions included in the draft may create an
unbalanced intellectual property system).
19 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 4, at 3 ("The [proposed] provisions are [.. .] of
particular concern for developing countries and those that are considered to be
'net-importers' of intellectual property."); Yu, supra note 10, at 2 ("[The]
'TRIPS plus agreements' [... .] threaten to ignore the local needs, national
interests, technological capacities, institutional capacities and public health
conditions of many less developed countries."); Flynn et al., supra note 10, at
119-20.
20 IP Chapter, supra note 1.
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changes in the way the Experimental Use Clause is currently
drafted in order for it to properly serve its purpose.
The Experimental Use Clause was not included in the original
U.S. Proposal.2 1 It was proposed at a later stage by New Zealand,
Canada, Singapore, Chile, and Malaysia.2 2 The Experimental Use
Clause permits member states to adopt an exception from patent
infringement liability that would cover certain experimental uses of
a patented invention.2 3 Notably, the TRIPS Agreement did not
include a similar provision, but rather handled the topic of
permitted exceptions to the rights of the patent holder in a more
general manner by establishing a three-step test that any exception
adopted by a member state must satisfy. 24 The Three-Step Test is
repeated in the IP Chapter of the TPP,25 but it is accompanied by
21 See generally U.S. Proposal, supra note 7.
22 See IP Chapter, supra note 1, art. QQ.E.5ter.
23 For the proposed text of the Experimental Use Clause, see text accompanying
infra note 81.
24 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 30 ("Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties."). Certain
proposals made during the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement included more
specific provisions regarding permissible exceptions from the rights of the
patent holder. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS - A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
303 (2007) (OXFORD COMMENTARIES ON GATT/WTO AGREEMENTS) (noting
proposals made during the negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement, which
contained specific provisions regarding permissible exceptions from the rights
of the patent holder, such as the EEC submission contained in MTN.GNG/
NG1 1/W/26 of 7.7.88); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 471 (4th ed. 2012) (citing the July 23, 1990 draft,
which included specific exceptions, including one for "[a]cts done for
experimental purposes"). However, such proposals were not included in the final
text of the Trips Agreement due to the difficulty of the negotiating parties to
agree upon them.
25 See IP Chapter, supra note 1, art. E.5, which states that "[e]ach Party may
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent,
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third
OCT. 2014] 69
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two additional clauses addressing two specific types of permissible
exceptions: The Experimental Use Clause and a separate clause
dealing with "regulatory review" exceptions.2 6
In contrast to other arrangements included in the IP Chapter,
the Experimental Use Clause appears to operate to the benefit of
users rather than patent holders, by allowing member nations to
permit certain uses that would otherwise constitute infringement.2 7
This may be particularly valuable in the context of the TPP in light
of the seemingly IP maximalist agenda underlying the IP Chapter.28
As demonstrated below, one of the main rationales undergirding
the experimental use doctrine is the desire to enable follow-on
inventors to build upon the work of their predecessors while
making their own contribution. Setting an international norm
concerning the freedom to experiment with patented inventions
may thus have an important impact on promoting a global regime
that encourages cumulative innovation.
Comparative legal analysis shows that various legal systems
differ greatly in the manner in which they treat experimental use of
patents.29 While some countries have adopted relatively broad
parties." Article E.5 was included in the original proposal of the United States.
See Article 8(4) of the 1U.S. Proposal, supra note 7.
26 See IP Chapter, supra note 1, at art. E.5bis. A placeholder for such
provision, also titled "Bolar" provision, was already included in the U.S.
Proposal. See Section 5 of the U.S. Proposal, supra note 7. However, the actual
text of the provision was proposed later by New Zealand, Canada, Singapore,
Chile and Malaysia. Pursuant to the proposed Article E.5bis:
[E]ach Party may provide that a third person may do an act that would
otherwise infringe a patent if the act is done for purposes connected
with the collection and submission of data in order to comply with the
regulatory requirements of that Party or another country, including for
purposes connected with marketing or sanitary approval.
IP Chapter, supra note 1, at art. E.5bis. Another related provision in the IP Chapter
is Article E.13.
27 Clearly, an experimental use exception would still need to satisfy the Three-
Step Test. For discussion, see infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
See generally supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., Henrik Holzapfel & Joshua D. Sarnoff, A Cross-Atlantic Dialog
on Experimental Use and Research Tools, 48 IDEA 123, 199 (2008) (discussing
the differences between U.S. and European laws regarding experimental use of
patents).
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exceptions,30 allowing the performance of a variety of experimental
activities during the patent term, other countries have not followed
suit." In the United States, in particular, the scope of the
experimental use exception is extremely narrow.32 Even in countries
that employ relatively broad experimental use exceptions, there are
often significant uncertainties over the scope and application of
such exceptions." This reinforces the importance of adopting an
international standard concerning experimental use of patents. Such
a standard could have significant benefits in promoting uniformity
and removing uncertainty regarding this important topic. Clearly,
though, if a standard is to be set, it must be the right standard. This
Article seeks to evaluate whether this is indeed the case in the
context of the TPP.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the general
concept and the main policy considerations underlying the
Experimental Use Clause. As a basis for the ensuing discussion,
this Part demonstrates the essential role that an experimental use
exception may play in attaining a properly balanced patent system
that enables follow-on research and development based on
patented inventions. In light of the importance of the matter, and
considering the high level of uncertainty surrounding it, this
Article demonstrates that adopting an international standard
regarding experimental use of patents can be highly beneficial. In
Part III, however, the analysis turns to take a close look at the
actual text of the Experimental Use Clause, and this examination
reveals that, as currently drafted, the clause fails to serve as an
appropriate standard for the following reasons: First, the Experimental
Use Clause does not mandate the member parties to adopt an
experimental use exception but merely permits them to do so. Second,
the clause fails to provide guidance regarding the applicability of
the experimental use exception in commercial settings. And third,
30 Notable examples for countries that have adopted wide experimental use
exceptions are Belgium and Israel. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying
text.
31 An example for a country that does not have an experimental use exception
at all is South Africa. See infra note 76.
32 See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
33 See, e.g., Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 126-27.
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the clause leaves outside its scope important scenarios of
cumulative innovation, including the use of patented research tools
for the purpose of developing a different invention. Based on this
analysis, Part IV recommends certain revisions to the manner in
which the Experimental Use Clause is currently drafted, in order to
increase its chances to facilitate the creation of a global legal
environment supportive of cumulative research and development.
II. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE
CLAUSE
Under the dominant utilitarian justification for the patent
system,34 patent law ought to reflect a balance of the benefits
associated with patents in promoting technological progress against
their adverse effects." Among the costs associated with the patent
system is the potential chilling effect of a patent on follow-on
research and development. 6 Technological research and development
is often conducted in a cumulative manner.3 7 When the information
34 See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - The
Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267 (1996) (surveying the
economic justifications for the patent system offered over the years).
3 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 619 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (noting
the view of patents as reflecting a balance between providing incentives to
inventors and providing access to the members of the public).
36 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 253 (1994).
3 Cumulative innovation is far from being a new phenomenon. As early as
1675, Sir Isaac Newton noted: "If I have seen further[,] it is by standing on the
shoulders of giants." Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675),
reprinted in ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN
POSTSCRIPT, THE POST-ITALIANTE VERSION 1 (1993). For the prevalence of
cumulative innovation in different technological fields, see, for example, Robert
P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (providing a general account of cumulative
innovation in various industries); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over
Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union:
An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1623, 1691 (focusing on follow-on research involving patented DNA
sequences); Clarisa Long, Patent Law and Policy Symposium: Re-Engineering
Patent Law: The Challenge of New Technologies: Part II. Judicial Issues:
Patents and Cumulative Innovation, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229, 233-46
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required in order to pursue a follow-on research and development
project is covered by a patent, there is a potential conflict between
the exclusive rights of the patent holder and the need to make use
of her invention in order to make further developments. The patent
system must take this potential conflict into consideration and
ensure that the exclusive rights granted to the patent owner do not
end up stifling technological research and development rather than
promoting it."
One of the primary potential measures that may assist in
facilitating cumulative innovation is the adoption of an experimental
use exception, allowing for certain experimental uses of the patented
invention to take place during the patent term without the need to
receive the patentee's advance permission." Such experimental uses
of the original invention may ultimately result in the development
(2000) (discussing cumulative innovation biomedical research). For a detailed
account of cumulative innovation, see Ofer Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation in
Patent Law: Making Sense of Incentives, 50 IDEA 723 (2010) [hereinafter Tur-
Sinai, Cumulative Innovation].
38 The discussion in this paragraph implicitly assumes that encouraging
cumulative innovation is in society's best interest. A detailed analysis of this
matter exceeds the scope of this Article. For relevant discussion, see Tur-Sinai,
Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 733-35.
39 For a detailed explanation of the experimental use exception's role in
facilitating cumulative innovation, see discussion infra notes 40-50 and
accompanying text. For scholars advocating a wide experimental use exception
in patent law, see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the
Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 224-31 (1987)
[hereinafter Eisenberg, Rights]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress
of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,
1078 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patents]; Irving N. Feit, Biotechnology
Research and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 819, 839-41 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No
"Dilettante Affair: " Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 66 (2001);
Tom Saunders, Case Comment: Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants:
Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261,
268 (2003); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 119-52 (2004); Wendy
Thai, Toward Facilitating Access to Patented Research Tools, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 373, 390-97 (2004); Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37,
at 754-58.
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of follow-on inventions. The importance of enabling potential
inventors to conduct experiments without permission from patent
owners stems, to a large extent, from the difficulty in relying on
voluntary license agreements permitting such experiments to be
executed in the free market.40 There are various reasons why the
chances for achieving such ex ante agreements are not high.4 '
Among other things, at this point in time, before the relevant
research project has even commenced, transaction costs are
particularly high due to the great level of uncertainty surrounding
the relevant parameters. Such parameters include, inter alia, the
development costs of the follow-on invention, the risks associated
with the project, and the expected value of the resulting
innovation. 42 There is also the inherent difficulty of agreeing upon
the relative contributions of sequential inventors.43 Furthermore,
having no exclusive legal rights to her prospective invention at this
early stage, the follow-on inventor might hesitate to disclose
confidential information about her research agenda to the original
40 For empirical evidence attesting to such difficulty, see infra note 46.
41 See generally, with respect to the difficulties associated with bargaining in a
cumulative innovation setting, Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement
in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1052-65 (1997); Merges &
Nelson, supra note 37, at 874-75; Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 CoLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2000). For the
reasons specified in the text, when it comes to an ex ante agreement-i.e., an
agreement which is concluded before the development of the second
invention-the chances for the conclusion of an agreement are particularly low.
42 See Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 753. See also Eisenberg,
Rights, supra note 39, at 217 (discussing the difficulty of valuing the right to use
a patented invention before the research project is completed); Timothy J.
Engling, Improvements in Patent Licensing, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 739, 741-42, 746 (1996) (maintaining that a future improvement cannot
be valued upfront); Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 895 n.251 (pointing out
that valuation problems in licensing transactions are difficult enough after an
invention has been developed and are seemingly even more difficult prior to its
development).
43 This difficulty may exist even after the follow-on invention has been
developed, "as each inventor may have an inflated idea of their own contribution
or not understand the other's contribution." See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, Cumulative
Innovation, supra note 37, at 751; Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights
and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV.
75, 89-91 (1994).
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inventor, who may potentially use such information for the original
inventor's own benefit in case the deal falls through." Finally, in
some situations, anti-competitive motives of the original patentee,
who wishes to retain sole control of the market, may cause her to
refuse licensing her invention to other inventors, in order to block
them from improving on the invention or designing around it.45
The concerns outlined above are not merely theoretical, but rather
are backed by a number of empirical studies that provide evidence
regarding delays or impediments to follow-on research projects as
a result of various factors, including high transaction costs and
licensing failures.46
44 See Howard F. Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 34, 38 n.6 (1995) (noting that while the
follow-on inventor may not be able to induce the original inventor to get into a
deal without disclosing her idea, such disclosure may undermine her bargaining
power). See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation
of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615-616 (Richard R. Nelson
ed., 1962) (noting the quandary of disclosing information without legal rights to
the invention).
45 See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 751.
46 See studies cited by Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 143-44 n.98;
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem?
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059,
1098 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Noncompliance] (describing studies
suggesting that product development firms face a growing burden of transaction
costs to identify and clear rights); Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2182-83 (2009) (describing empirical studies
indicating, among other things, the slowdown of development in industry as
university patenting has increased). See also James E. Bessen, Holdup and
Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private Information, 82 ECON.
LETTERS 321, 322 (2004) (demonstrating that ex ante licensing, in particular, is
not a prevalent practice in industries characterized by cumulative innovation).
But see John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al.]
(providing survey results indicating that the patenting of research tools in the
biomedical industry has generally not been viewed as having a substantial
negative effect on further research in the field). The main explanation for the
results, supplied in the study, is that firms and universities have been able to
develop "working solutions" that allow their research to proceed, which one of
them is, simply, "taking licenses." Id. at 286. The authors opine that "it is
OCT. 2014] 75
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
In light of this potential market failure, certain experimental
uses must be allowed to take place during the patent term even
without the patent owner's consent. A properly designed
experimental use exception can achieve exactly this result. Under
such an exception, a follow-on inventor would be able to work on
her project without the need to disclose the matter to the original
patentee, and upon completion, may even register a patent on her
invention.47 Because the experimental use exception, by its nature,
only applies to experimental activities carried on during the
development stage, the follow-on inventor may still need a license
from the original patentee in order to manufacture, use, or sell her
follow-on invention.48 However, the follow-on inventor would
most likely find it easier to approach the original patentee at this
later stage, particularly if she has already applied for patent
protection on her invention.49 All in all, the chances of concluding
such an ex post agreement, under which the profits from the
commercial exploitation of the follow-on invention would be
typically not that difficult to contract" and state that "[I]icensing is routine in the
drug industry." Id. at 322. It should be noted, however, that the study of Walsh
et al. focused primarily on the effects of patents on the research science
community itself while paying relatively little attention to the effects of such
patents on downstream product development. See Eisenberg, Noncompliance,
supra, at 1076, 1098. In any event, even the authors of the study admit that there
is "some evidence of delays associated with negotiating access to patented
research tools, and there are areas . . . where access to foundational discoveries
can be restricted." See Walsh et al., at 286. All in all, even if there are indeed
cases where the parties can manage to come to an agreement despite the
difficulties described above, there surely remain other cases where a voluntary
agreement cannot be counted on.
47 In such a scenario, the original patent and the follow-on patent are
sometimes referred to as "blocking patents." See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER,
INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 129 (2006); Lemley, supra note 41, at 1008-10;
Merges & Nelson, supra note 37, at 860-62.
48 It should be noted that the need for a license in order to exploit the follow-
on invention only arises when such activity falls under the scope of the original
patent. Indeed, in legal systems that employ a wide experimental use exception,
it is particularly important to design the rules governing patent scope in such a
manner in order to guarantee the original patentee's right to profit from follow-
on inventions. See infra notes 72, 136-41 and accompanying text.
49 See supra note 44 and accompanying text with respect to the difficulty of
conducting negotiation with the original patentee absent legal protection.
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divided between the parties, seem to be higher than the chances of
agreeing on the matter ex ante.50 Thus, the experimental use
exception is an important tool in facilitating cumulative innovation.
An experimental use exception to the rights of the patent holder
can be justified not only from economic efficiency considerations,
but also from the perspective of certain non-utilitarian
justifications for the patent system-particularly, the labor theory
and the personality theory. Under the labor theory, every person
has a right to the fruits of her labor.5' The labor theory is one of the
main theories for justifying rights in private property,52 and it has
been used for the justification and analysis of intellectual property
rights as well.53 One of the conditions for acquiring property, under
the labor theory, is that "there is enough, and as good, left in
common for others."54 In other words, "[o]ne may prevent others
from using her work products only if sufficient resources remain in
the public domain to allow others to labor and acquire property as
well."" In the context of patents, an experimental use exception
may be necessary in order to satisfy this condition. If potential
inventors are not allowed to use and incorporate previously
50 Admittedly, although ex post agreements are easier to negotiate than ex ante
agreements, they too cannot be taken for granted. As a result, there may be a
need to adopt liability rule doctrines in this context. For a detailed discussion,
see Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 760-66. See also infra
note 138.
5' The labor theory is based on the work of John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290-91 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
52 See, e.g., J. W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 182-212 (1996); STEPHEN
R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE
RIGHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 137-252 (Brotherhood eds., Jerusalem 1988).
5 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609, 609-10 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296-305 (1988); Benjamin G.
Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use
Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1180-83 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1538 (1993).
54 LOCKE, supra note 51, at 288.
5 Ofer Tur-Sinai, Beyond Incentives: Expanding the Theoretical Framework




patented inventions in their projects, they may not have a real
opportunity to engage in research and development.5 6
A similar argument can be made under the personality theory
of property," according to which, private property is necessary as a
means for developing and realizing one's personality." The
personality theory can provide justification for property rights in
various types of assets," including intellectual property assets.
With respect to intellectual property, a personhood interest may
result early on in certain cases from the fact that the product
reflects the personality of the individual who developed it.60 In
other cases, a personality bond between the intellectual product
and its owner may develop at a later stage." In the cumulative
innovation context discussed herein, the personality theory can
bolster the arguments in favor of an experimental use exception in
patent law. This is because entrusting control over experimental
uses of an invention in the hands of the patent owner denies "other
potential inventors an opportunity to develop follow-on inventions
based on such invention, and thus, narrows their opportunities to
engage in research and development and express their own
personality through such activity."62
Beyond the role that an experimental use exception may serve
in enabling follow-on research and innovation, an experimental use
exception may have value in other contexts as well. Such an
exception provides members of the public with the freedom to
engage in experiments for the purpose of "gratifying a philosophical
56 See id at 270 (arguing that the labor theory supports the adoption of an
experimental use exception in patent law).
5 This theory is based on the work of Hegel. See generally G.W.F. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (S.W. Dyde trans., 1996) (1821). It has been further refined
by Margaret Radin. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood,
34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
58 HEGEL, supra note 57, at 51-52.
59 See generally Radin, supra note 57.
60 See Tur-Sinai, Beyond Incentives, supra note 55, at 278-79. This is certainly
the case with respect to many creative works of authorship, the subject matter of
copyright protection. Yet, this may also be the case with respect to various
technological properties.
61 See id. at 279-80.
62 See id. at 281-82.
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taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement." 63 Permitting experimental
use of patented inventions may also be beneficial in facilitating the
testing and evaluation of patents by third parties." This may result
in the nullification of invalid patents and the restoration of
competition in the domains covered by such patents.65 Furthermore,
experiments are often necessary for the purpose of designing
around the patent in an attempt to seek alternative solutions to the
same technological problem.66
The main argument against the adoption of a broad
experimental use exception is that it might undermine the value of
patents by depriving patent owners of the license fees to which
they might otherwise be entitled.67 The experimental use exception
may also, in certain circumstances, facilitate the generation of
improvements that may serve as market substitutes for the original
invention.6' Therefore, an experimental use exception may ultimately
result in reducing the incentives to make and disclose patentable
inventions in the first place.69 Whether such incentives would be
reduced to a sub-optimal level is unclear.70 In any event, in order to
properly balance the considerations at stake, many scholars
discussing the experimental use exception have suggested the
exception be qualified in various manners to distinguish between
63 Poppenhausen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1049, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No.
11,279).
64 See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600) (noting, in dictum, that "it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to
produce its described effects").
65 See, e.g., Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 16619 F. Cas. 104968.
66 For the importance of enabling competitors to design around patents, see,
for example, Gordon, supra note 35, at 632. See also Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l
Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Yarway Corp. v.
Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
67 See, e.g., Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 165-66.
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 39, at 1033.
70 Cf id. at 1030 (noting that the incentive theories do not supply an answer to
the empirical question of how much incentive is necessary for an optimal level
of invention and disclosure).
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permissible and non-permissible experiments." Still, others have
urged a non-qualified application of an experimental use exception,
while proposing to compensate the original inventor for the use of
her invention in other manners.72 All in all, it seems fair to suggest
that there is a wide consensus among scholars as to the necessity
for an experimental use exception, albeit its potential costs."
In light of the foregoing discussion, one might expect that a
relatively wide experimental use exception would be an integral
part of every patent system in the world. However, there is a gap
between this policy ideal and reality. While many countries have
indeed adopted some sort of an experimental use exception, by
statute74 or case law, 7 an experimental use exception does not exist
7 For example, one parameter that has been suggested in the literature is to
apply the exception only where the likelihood for agreement between the parties
is evidently low. See DAVID GILAT, Experimental Use and Patents, 16 IIC STUD.
1, 39-42 (1995). Another suggested distinction is between users motivated by
profit and users with other motivations. See, e.g., Richard E. Bee, Experimental
Use as an Act of Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 357 (1957). Cf
Gitter, supra note 37, at 1628, 1679 (proposing to apply different rules with
respect to commercially driven research and other research). Finally, some
commentators have suggested distinguishing between research users who
compete with the patent owner in the same market and research users who are
"regular consumers" of the invention. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Patents, supra note
39, at 1074-78; Eisenberg, Rights, supra note 39, at 225; GILAT, supra, at 44-45.
A detailed discussion of such proposals is outside the scope of this Article.
72 See, e.g., Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 743 (maintaining
that the commercial exploitation of a follow-on invention must be included in
the scope of the original patent, in order to ensure that the first inventor is
always allocated a portion of the profits).
7 But see Jordan P. Karp, Note: Experimental Use as Patent Infringement:
The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991) (arguing
against a broad experimental use exception); Alan Devlin, Restricting Experimental
Use, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2009) (supporting the current narrow
construction of the experimental use exception in the United States).
74 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Law], 16 December 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
Teil I [BGBL. I] at 14 § 11.2, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 19, 2013, BGBL.
I at 3380, art. I (Ger.), translated in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY app.
11 (Bernd Ruster ed., Matthew Bender 2014); Patent Act, 1977, c. 37 § 60(5)(b)
(U.K.); Lei da Propriedade Industrial [Industrial Patent Law], 14 de maio de
1996, DLARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 9.279 § 43, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/detailsjsp?id=515 (Braz.); Patent Law (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l. People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective April 1,
80 [VOL. 16: 63
The Trans-Pacific Partnership
at all in other countries." Among the legal systems that employ an
experimental use exception, there are extensive differences
regarding its breadth." In some jurisdictions, including the United
States, the scope of the experimental use exception is so limited,
that it is fair to say that the exception is practically non-existent."
In general, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding
the scope of the exception.7 9
1985) (amended 2008), 2008 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ.
§ 69(2), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=178664
(China); The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970 § 47(3), INDIA CODE (2013), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in; Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 69, para. 1,
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ seisaku/hourei/data/PA.pdf (Japan).
7 This is the case, for example, in Canada. See Micro Chemicals Ltd. v. Smith
Kline & French Inter-American Corp., [1972] S.C.R. 506; Merck & Co. v.
Apotex Inc., [2007] 3 F.C.R. 588, para. 109. This is also the case in the United
States, where the origin of the exception is commonly traced to Whittemore v.
Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600). Notably,
alongside the common law exception, a separate statutory exception exempts
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information
needed for a regulatory approval to manufacture, use, or sell generic drugs or
veterinary biological products after the expiration of the patent. This exception
was enacted as part of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C. (1984)).
76 This is the case, for example, in South Africa. See Questionnaire on
Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights, WIPO: EXCEPTIONS (Sept. 1, 2014)
http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/exceptions. In Australia, after a long period of
uncertainty regarding the matter, an explicit experimental use exception was
enacted in 2012. See Australian Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s. 119 (c).
n For a detailed comparison between the exceptions employed in various
legal systems, see RICHARD GOLD & YANN JOLY, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND
RESEARCH FREEDOM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 4(1-42 (20 10), http://www.wipo.
int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/sp_15/scp_15_3-annex6.pdf [hereinafter GOLD & JOLY];
WIPO, EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS TO PATENT RIGHTS: EXPERIMENTAL USE
AND/OR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (2013), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/patent
policy/en/scp_20/scp_20_4.pdf.
78 For the use of the term "evanescent" to describe the U.S. exception, see
Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United
States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit
Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004). See also infra
notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
7 See generally GOLD & JOLY, supra note 77, at 42 (noting, for example, that
in many cases, it is not even clear what constitutes an "experiment").
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Against this background, the potential benefits of adopting an
international standard regarding experimental use of patents are
apparent. A properly crafted experimental use clause in an international
instrument could promote uniformity among countries regarding
the existence and scope of the experimental use exception and
reduce the uncertainties regarding the applicability of the exception
in various circumstances. This may be particularly important in our
current era of globalization, where innovation is often conducted
by multi-national enterprises with R&D facilities in numerous
jurisdictions. Harmonization of patent laws with respect to the
freedom to experiment with patented inventions will alleviate the
burden, which may otherwise be placed on such enterprises to
understand diverse patent laws and take them into consideration in
devising their R&D strategy. As to the content of such harmonized
global standard, the discussion above clearly supports the adoption
of a relatively broad experimental use exception.
Beyond the direct potential effects of adopting an experimental
use clause as part of an international instrument governing the IP
field, such step may also indicate, in a more general manner, a
commitment by the international community to the public interest
dimension of intellectual property law. This is particularly important
considering the general tendency of international instruments
dealing with IP to focus on an owners' rights perspective while
failing to safeguard user rights and other public interests."o As
noted above, the current draft of the TPP's IP Chapter, in
particular, leans heavily towards the interest of IP rights holders.
so It is interesting to note, in this context, the Washington Declaration on
Intellectual Property and the Public Interest issued on August 2011 by a group
of over 180 experts from 32 countries and 6 continents, who convened to re-
articulate the public interest dimension in intellectual property law and policy.
THE GLOBAL CONGRESS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, THE WASHINGTON DECLARATION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2011), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/
Washington-Declaration.pdf [hereinafter Washington Declaration]. Among
other things, the Washington Declaration notes that limitations and exceptions to
intellectual property rights are under threat, as a result of "efforts to recast
international law as a constraint on the exercise of flexibilities in domestic
legislation" and calls for "the development of binding international agreements
providing for mandatory minimum limitations and exceptions."
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Therefore, having a provision in the IP Chapter designed to protect
user rights may serve an important balancing function. Needless to
say, the declaratory value of an experimental use clause included
in a plurilateral trade agreement may have an impact outside the
immediate circle of the member nations. Eventually, such a norm
may be adopted as part of a more inclusive international instrument.
Yet, in order for the Experimental Use Clause to have such
beneficial effects, it must be properly crafted. Part III takes a close
look at the way the Experimental Use Clause is currently drafted in
order to evaluate whether this is indeed the case.
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE CLAUSE
The Experimental Use Clause currently reads as follows:
1. Consistent with [Article QQ.E.5 (Exceptions)], each Party may
provide that a third person may do an act that would otherwise
infringe a patent if the act is done for experimental purposes
relating to the subject matter of a patented invention.
2. For the purposes of this Article, experimental purposes may
include, but need not be limited to, determining how the invention
works, determining the scope of the invention, determining the
validity of the claims, or seeking an improvement of the invention
(for example, determining new properties, or new uses, of the
invention).8 '
As demonstrated below, the proposed Experimental Use Clause
has a few notable shortcomings: (a) the use of permissive
language; (b) a lack of guidance regarding the applicability of the
experimental use exception in commercial settings; and (c) a
narrow scope resulting in important scenarios of cumulative
innovation being left out.
A. Permissive Language
The Experimental Use Clause provides that member parties
"6may" adopt an experimental use exception but does not mandate
that they do so.82 The use of permissive language, thus, leaves the
matter at the discretion of each member party. Such discretionary
authority may not be sufficient in encouraging countries that do not




currently have an effective experimental use exception to amend
their patent laws in order to create such an exception or broaden an
existing one." In developed countries, in particular, any attempt to
enact legislation that may be perceived, justifiably or not, as
weakening patent protection would most likely encounter strong
objection on behalf of various interest groups.8 4 Thus, without
mandatory restraints that would be imposed by the international
regime, the Experimental Use Clause is not likely to have a
significant influence in pushing member nations' patent laws in the
right direction." Hence, the benefits of having a harmonized global
standard regarding the matter may not be attained. This is a major
weakness of the Experimental Use Clause as currently drafted.
Most importantly, adhering to the model of "mandatory rights"
and "permissive exceptions and limitations," which has dominated
international instruments in the IP arena for many years,"
reinforces the rights-centric approach characterizing the global
intellectual property regime, while leaving user privileges at the
8 Cf Ruth L. Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations,
Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries, 15
UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1, 12 (2006)
(noting, in connection with exceptions to copyright, that "within the highly
contested space of negotiating domestic policy priorities, the evidence over the
last decade firmly establishes the insufficiency of discretionary power in both
developed and developing countries").
84 See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent
Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 318, 325 (2006) (noting that the
biotechnological industry is against virtually all of the major proposed reforms
to patent law that would weaken patents or restrict the rights of patent holders);
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent System,
87 N.C. L. REv. 1341, 1353, 1359-61 (2009) (discussing the lobbying efforts on
behalf of pharmaceutical companies in order to maintain a strong patent system).
85 Cf Washington Declaration, supra note 80 (supporting the development of
binding international agreements providing for mandatory minimum limitations
and exceptions to intellectual property rights).
86 See Okediji, supra note 83, at 9 (describing this as the prevailing model in
international instruments). This model goes back to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24,
1971, and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989).
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margin." Such approach does not sufficiently take into account
existing practices and norms that have evolved in different
countries since the execution of the TRIPS Agreement in 1994."
Moreover, it does not fit within the modem-day innovation landscape,
where the paradigm of cumulative innovation is prevalent and user
innovation is a robust phenomenon." Ultimately, the rights-centric
approach fails to reflect the growing understanding of scholars and
policy makers that in order for intellectual property law to fulfill its
ultimate goal of promoting creativity and innovation, it must
enable the public to engage in a wide range of activities otherwise
covered by IP rights. 90
Yet, despite this critique of the permissive structure of the
Experimental Use Clause, it is not realistic to expect a current
revision of the Experimental Use Clause that would transform it
into a mandatory provision. This is so, exactly because of the fact
that exceptions and limitations to IP rights have been traditionally
addressed in a permissive manner in international instruments
governing the field, including the TRIPS Agreement. Deviating
from this standard structure would be a disruption of a
long-standing status quo, and it is highly unlikely that the
negotiating members of the TPP would opt for it. Among other
reasons, the United States, which has only a very narrow
experimental use exception in place, is a negotiating party to the
87 Cf Okediji, supra note 83, at 12 (noting, with respect to copyright law, that
the "absence of mandatory minimum limitations and exceptions reinforces the
dominant ethos of the international copyright system as primarily author-
centric").
88 As stated above, many countries have adopted experimental use exceptions
as part of their patent laws. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. Cf
Okediji, supra note 83, at 12 (noting, in the context of copyright law, that "[i]f
the historic development of international copyright regulation has reflected both
the principles and the practices of member states, then there is no reason why
only the rights-oriented side of such practices should be integrated as mandatory
norms of the international order").
89 For the robustness of user innovation, see ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING
INNOVATION (2005); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications
for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008); William W. Fisher Ill,
The Implication for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010).
90 See, e.g., Washington Declaration, supra note 80.
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TPP.9 1 One can expect, both in the United States and in other
developed countries, a strong objection on behalf of various
interest groups against the adoption of a standard that mandates the
implementation of a more robust exception.92 Thus, albeit not
optimal, a permissive provision regarding experimental use seems
to be the most that one can hope for currently.93
In truth, despite its weakness relative to a mandatory standard,
a permissive provision may still serve as a "nudge" for countries to
adopt an experimental use exception or broaden the scope of an
existing exception.94 Such a "nudge" may be most potent with
respect to developing countries, which may otherwise be subject to
pressure from the outside world that might circumvent any
attempts to weaken IP rights. In fact, a wide experimental use may
be particularly beneficial for such developing countries, which
tend to be net importers of intellectual property, in facilitating
knowledge spillovers from developed countries and enabling the
local technological community to engage in follow-on innovation
91 For the narrow scope of the experimental use exception in the United
States, see infra note 78 and accompanying text.
92 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
93 Surely, a permissive provision can become mandatory at some point in the
future because of later revision acts. As an example for a provision in an IP
international instrument that was originally designed as an optional provision
and became mandatory in future negotiations, see Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 7 (Sept. 9, 1886) available at
http://www.law.comell.edu/treaties/beme/overview.html. Article 7 originally set
a copyright term of life plus fifty but allowed contracting states with shorter
terms to retain these terms. Yet, in 1948, the life plus fifty term became
mandatory for all contracting states. See STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN
COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY, RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE
FUTURE 104 n. 368 (2011).
94 Cf RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). As an example
for a treaty provision which has been gradually adopted by member nation
despite its permissive language, consider the droit de-suite case. While the
Berne Convention provides that the implementation of droit de-suite is optional,
more than seventy countries so far have introduced droit de-suite for visual
artists in their legislation. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE: RESALE
ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS (December 2013), http://www.copyright.gov/
docs/resaleroyalty/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf, p. 8 and Appendix A.
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and in attempts to design around patented technologies.9 5 This is
predominantly true with respect to developing countries that
nevertheless demonstrate strong technological capabilities such as
Brazil, India, and China, as these countries have a better potential
to utilize the exception and benefit from it.96
Another reason why a wide experimental use exception may be
predominantly advantageous for developing countries is the
possibility that such an exception would be a factor in the decision
of foreign enterprises to offshore their R&D to such developing
countries. Yet, this potential effect of the experimental use
exception should also serve as a catalyst for developed countries to
adopt the doctrine, in order to motivate local enterprises to keep
their R&D facilities in the country.98 In addition, by facilitating the
development of improvements and alternatives to a patented
invention, the adoption of an experimental use exception may
increase domestic rivalry, which constitutes an important determinant
of competitive advantage of one country over other countries.99
Therefore, developing countries may benefit as well from the
95 See Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The "Experimental Use"
Exception Through a Developmental Lens, 50 IDEA 831, 842-43 (2010)
(discussing the link between an experimental use exception and the prospect of
knowledge spillovers through patents).
96 See id. at 843-44 (providing the example of the Indian pharmaceutical
industry, which has developed a strong set of skills in the field of incremental
innovation).
97 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign
Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY - UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 635, 640 n.25 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005)
(noting that follow-on inventors may prefer to establish R&D facilities in
countries that employ experimental use exceptions); Basheer & Reddy, supra
note 95, at 846 (suggesting that "India must actively leverage the existence of its
rather wide research exception to attract more research from the United States").
98 See, e.g., William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents,
54 B.C. L. REV. 1909, 1957 (2013) (noting that "in the absence of a robust
experimental use defense in U.S. patent law, some U.S. companies may be
forced to locate research facilities outside of the United States").
99 See id. at 1953, 1957 (maintaining that "[b]ecause the experimental use
defense is weaker in the United States than in other jurisdictions, U.S. patent law
limits domestic competition more than foreign patent law restricts foreign
competition, thereby reducing the competitive advantage of U.S. firms").
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adoption of an experimental use exception, and an international
norm may add certain weight in this direction against the expected
pressure from interest groups.
Furthermore, a significant role that even a permissive clause in
an international instrument may play is providing assurance to
countries that wish to adopt or enhance a relevant provision
regarding their compliance with the international legal framework.
As explained above, the TRIPS Agreement does not specifically
address experimental use of patents, but rather establishes a general
Three-Step Test as the governing framework for exceptions to the
rights of the patent holder.'" While it is reasonable to assume that
an experimental use clause would normally satisfy the Three-Step
Test,'"' an explicit clarification to this effect can remove any
remaining uncertainty and provide valuable guidance as to the
legitimate scope of the exception.'O2 Admittedly, though, as the
TPP does not supersede the TRIPS Agreement, but merely
supplements it for its twelve member parties, an experimental use
exception can still run afoul of the Three-Step Test. This is made
clear in the Experimental Use Clause itself, which includes the
qualifying phrase: "Consistent with [Article E.5 (Exceptions)]."
Article E.5 essentially reiterates the TRIPS Agreement's Three-
Step Test.0 3 Implementing an experimental use exception by any
member party in reliance on the TPP's permissive language thus
would not necessarily shield it from a finding that it violates its
1oo See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 24, at 473 (maintaining that the type of
exceptions that a member party may wish to introduce based on the Three-Step
Test established by Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement could include, among
other things, experimental use exceptions); CORREA, supra note 24, at 303
(noting that "[i]n the light of current comparative patent law and on other
proposals made on the subject . . . using the invention for research and
experimentation" is among the exceptions that may be deemed legitimate within
the scope of Article 30). A detailed discussion of this question exceeds the scope
of this Article.
102 See generally Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
(WT/DS 1 14/R), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/7428d.pdf (demonstrating
the uncertainty surrounding the scope of permitted exceptions under Article 30
of the TRIPS Agreement).
103 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. From this perspective, the
only thing that could provide real comfort regarding the freedom to
adopt an experimental use exception in patent law seems to be an
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement itself that would address this
in a definitive manner.104
Finally, a permissive standard may have one advantage over a
mandatory one. A mandatory provision, if adopted, would have to
reflect a balance between the demands of all member parties, and
as a result, may be drafted in a very general manner without
providing the necessary clarifications with respect to various
doctrinal questions related to the scope and application of the
experimental use exception. It is actually quite possible that such a
mandatory provision would conform to the "lowest common
denominator," and thus allow the enactment of very narrow
exceptions, along the lines of the current United States'
experimental use doctrine. Under such an international regime, the
member nations may not even have flexibility to adopt broader
experimental use exceptions, inasmuch as the mandatory clause is
construed as exhaustive. Conversely, under a permissive provision,
while strong harmonization cannot be achieved, it should
presumably be easier to negotiate a more elaborate provision that
would set guidance to the member parties regarding the scope of
the exceptions that they may legitimately implement as part of
their patent laws. The next sub-parts consider whether the
Experimental Use Clause, as currently drafted, provides such
guidance. Unfortunately, as demonstrated below, this does not
seem to be the case.
B. No Guidance Regarding the Exception's Applicability in
Commercial Settings
One of the potential benefits of having a treaty provision
addressing the experimental use exception is providing clear
guidelines to countries regarding the proper construction of the
doctrine. Yet, the Experimental Use Clause does not appear likely
to have a significant impact if it remains as currently drafted.
104 For early proposals for more specific provisions made during the
negotiations of the TRIPS Agreement, see supra note 24.
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Beyond the limitations of a permissive provision, which, by its
nature, cannot guarantee uniformity among member states, the
current version of the Experimental Use Clause is not detailed
enough to clear the fog around various aspects related to the
application of the experimental use doctrine.
One such important question that the Experimental Use Clause
does not address is whether the exception may apply to
experimental acts done for commercial purposes. This is one area
where extensive differences exist between various legal systems
regarding the scope of the doctrine. In some jurisdictions, the fact
that a commercial purpose underlies the experimental activity does
not preclude an application of the exception."o' Yet, in other
jurisdictions the exception only encompasses non-commercial
research."o6 One such jurisdiction is the United States, where courts
have consistently maintained that a commercial motive as the basis
of the experimental use negates application of the exception, even
if the commercial activity is meant to commence only after the
patent has expired.'o7 Under recent case law, the commercial
connection barring the application of the exception could be very
remote. In Madey v. Duke University,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit refused to apply the exception even
in the context of basic research conducted by scientists in a non-
profit research university, stating that:
105 See, e.g., Patentgesetz [Patent Law], 16 December 1980, BUNDESGESETZBLATr,
Teil I [BGBL. 1] at 14, § 11.2, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 19, 2013,
BGBL. I at 3380, art. I (Ger.), translated in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY
app. 11 (Bernd Ruster ed., Matthew Bender 2014); Patent Act, 1977, c. 37
§ 60(5)(b) (U.K.).
106 See, e.g., Industrial Property Law of Mexico, art. 22 and Argentine Law
24.481, art. 36.
107 See, e.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (stating the narrow construction of the experimental use exception);
Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int'l B.V., 862 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D. Mass. 1994)
(clarifying that "[t]he experimental use exception does not protect experiments
or tests which have a commercial purpose"); Pfizer, Inc. v. Int'l Rectifier Corp.,
No. 73-58, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17411, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 1982)
(holding that experimental use "cannot be invoked for the protection of one who
uses a patented invention commercially").
'os 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court declined to hear the
case on review. See 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
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[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in
an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of
the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solely for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical
inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited
experimental use defense. 09
In finding infringement, the Federal Circuit maintained that
research projects conducted in a university setting "unmistakably
further the institution's legitimate business objectives, including
educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in
these projects," and that such projects "also serve, for example, to
increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research
grants, students and faculty.""o
In order for the experimental use exception to enable
cumulative innovation in a variety of settings, the exception must
be available to follow-on inventors even if they are motivated by
the prospect of commercial success. In current days, most
inventors can be assumed to be at least partially motivated by the
prospect of commercial success."' In light of the high level of
uncertainty and lack of uniformity among different legal systems
surrounding this specific question, it would be optimal if the
Experimental Use Clause explicitly addressed it." 2 Even under the
current permissive design of the clause, it can be clarified that
member parties may choose to apply their experimental use
.exceptions in commercial settings as well. Such treatment of this
aspect in a manner that leaves discretion to the member parties
109 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
110 Id.
.. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 39, at 1023 (stating that even
academic research is often motivated at least in part by commercial interests);
Peter Ruess, Accepting Exceptions?: A Comparative Approach to Experimental
Use in U.S. and German Patent Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 81, 89
(2006) (noting that "universities are very much in the business of research, and
many are generating substantial revenues for experiments or earning
considerable royalties from patents in the commercial sector").
112 Again, this would not guarantee that an exception adopted by a member
party would pass muster under the Three-Step Test. However, there is good
reason to believe that an exception covering commercial activities would be




should not trigger objection on behalf of countries that currently
employ narrower exceptions, including the United States. Eventually,
a treaty provision that includes a clarification to this effect may
have impact on decision makers that consider the matter even in
such jurisdictions.
C. Narrow Scope of the Exception Allowed by the Experimental
Use Clause
There is another important aspect that is not sufficiently taken
care of in the current draft of the Experimental Use Clause. In
prescribing what may be the scope of experimental use exceptions
adopted by the member parties, the Experimental Use Clause is
drafted too narrowly. Under the clause, an exception may apply
only to acts done for "experimental purposes relating to the subject
matter of a patented invention."' This phrase is in use by various
countries that have adopted an experimental use exception,' and
is commonly interpreted as limiting the exception to experiments
on an invention, as distinguished from experiments with an
invention."' Thus, an exception designed in this manner does not
cover experimental use of the invention that aims at researching or
developing a different subject matter. Accordingly, while clearly
covering the scenario of improvements to a patented invention,"6 it
113 See IP Chapter, supra note 1, art. QQ.E5ter.
114 This language is used, for example, in Article 27 of the Community Patent
Convention (Luxembourg Convention for the European Patent for the Common
Market, Dec. 15, 1975, as amended by the Agreement Relating to Community
Patents, Dec. 15, 1989, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:41989AO695(0 1):EN:HTML). Many European countries have adopted
similar language in their national laws. See, e.g., UK Patents Act, 1977, c. 37,§ 60(5)(b), available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsactl977.pdf; Intellectual
Property Code, CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, Aug. 1,
2003, art. L613-5(b) (Fr.), available at www.jpo.go.jp/shiryoue/s-sonotae/
fipse/pdf/france e/echiteki_zaisan.pdf; Patents Act, 1992 (Act No. 1/1992)
§ 42(b) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish statutebook.ie/1992/en/act/pub/0001/
index.html.
"s See, e.g., GOLD & JOLY, supra note 77, at 41.
1l6The proposed Article E.5ter (2) explicitly addresses this scenario, while
providing that "experimental purposes may include ... seeking an improvement
of the invention (for example, determining new properties, or new uses, of the
invention)." IP Chapter, supra note 1, art. QQ.E.5ter(2).
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does not encompass other significant scenarios of cumulative
innovation, including, most importantly, the use of patented
research tools for purposes of follow-on innovation."' Research
tools are essentially "products or processes used in research to
investigate subjects other than the tools themselves.""' To
illustrate, in the biomedical field, research tools encompass "cell
lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and
cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and
machines."" 9 The use of a patented research tool for purposes of
investigating a subject matter that is not the tool itself is, by
definition, not an experiment "relating to the subject matter of a
patented invention," and thus it is outside the scope of the
Experimental Use Clause, as currently drafted. Another scenario of
cumulative innovation that may not be covered under the
Experimental Use Clause is the use of a basic technology for
purposes of developing applications in various technological
fields.'20 Here again, such experimental use may not count as
"relating to the subject matter" of the patented technology.
117 With respect to the research tools scenario, see generally Tur-Sinai,
Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 732.
18 Holzapfel & Samoff, supra note 29, at 124-25. For other possible
definitions of the term "research tools," see, Joshua D. Sarnoff & Christopher
M. Holman, Recent Developments Affecting the Enforcement, Procurement, and
Licensing of Research Tool Patents, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1299, 1302
(2008). See also Mueller, supra note 39, at 4, 14 (defining research tools in the
biomedical industry as "the many varied resources used by scientists to conduct
research and development of new drugs, therapies, diagnostic methods, and
other therapeutic products").
119 Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources:
Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72092 n.1 (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services Dec. 23, 1999), available at https://grants.nih.gov/grants/intell-
property 64FR72090.pdf.
S0 See generally SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 127-29, 132 (using the laser
technology as an example for this important scenario of cumulative innovation);
Carmen Matutes et al., Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations,
27 RAND J. ECON. 60, 60-61 (1996) (surveying other examples of basic
technologies with a variety of applications).
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Admittedly, the case for allowing experimental use with (rather
than on) a patented invention is not clear-cut. The main concern is
that providing an exception for users in such cases would deprive
the patent owner of a meaningful opportunity to profit from her
invention. The concern is heightened with respect to patented
inventions that are intended from the outset to serve as research
tools, and hence, their owners hold legitimate expectations to
receive commercial rewards from their use in research. Exempting
experimental uses in such cases may significantly reduce the
commercial value of the patent and decrease the incentive to
develop new research tools.'21 Another argument against allowing
experiments with patented research tools is that when the invention
serves as a means for conducting experiments that are not related
to the subject matter of the invention, there is no competition
between the patent owner and the research user. In such case, then,
there is arguably no reason to assume that the patent owner would
not grant a license to the research user.122
On the other hand, there are several strong arguments
supporting the expansion of the experimental use exception to
cover experiments for purposes not related to the subject matter of
the invention, as in the research tools scenario.'2 3 In general, all the
reasons outlined above in support of the experimental use
exception are applicable in such cases as well. The risk associated
with the need to disclose information that is not protected by
exclusive legal rights may deter potential users of research tools
from approaching the patent owner in an attempt to receive a
121 See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 39, at 1035. See also Holzapfel &
Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 247 (noting that the commercial rewards from
research markets for patented inventions intended as research tools are not
incidental to patent holder expectations, and are likely to be significant).
12 2 See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 39, at 1074, 1078; Eisenberg, Rights,
supra note 39, at 225; GILAT, supra note 71, at 44.
123 For other commentators supporting the application of an experimental use
exception in settings involving research tools, see, for example, Gitter, supra
note 37, at 1684-85 (proposing the application of the experimental use
exception with respect to noncommercial research in DNA sequences); Thai,
supra note 39, at 393-97 (suggesting the exemption of certain uses of research
tools in university research).
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license to use the tool. 2 4 Such risk exists even if the patent owner
herself is not directly involved in the same technological field as
the research user because she may pass along the information to
others. Even if the user gets over this initial hurdle and tries to
negotiate a voluntary license, the patent holder may be simply
unwilling to make the invention available on reasonable terms.125
Furthermore, high transaction costs may prevent the parties from
closing a deal, even if the parties are not competing against each
other. Among other things, the parties may find it difficult to reach
an agreement on various aspects of the transaction, including the
division of profits from the follow-on invention and the payments
due in case the project fails.126 These aspects may be particularly
problematic when the follow-on inventor must use multiple
patented research tools in order to develop her invention.127 In such
a setting, a "tragedy of the anticommons" might emerge,' and
obtaining all required licenses may not be feasible.129
124 See discussion supra note 44 and accompanying text.
125 See Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 180.
126 See Mueller, supra note 39, at 40 (noting that because of these difficulties
research users do not constitute "ordinary consumers" of the invention).
127 For an example, see SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 132 (discussing the
case of a bioengineered crop seed which may require for its development input
of multiple genes that code for various traits as well as research tools that
facilitate insertion of the genes into the germplasm).
128 The term "tragedy of the anticommons" refers to the problem that may
arise "when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce
resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use." See Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998).
129 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998)
(exploring the potential anticommons problem in biomedical research); Ron A.
Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of
Publicly Funded Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory
Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 1. 120, 144 (2007)
(noting that "there is significant evidence to suggest that the scientific commons
is eroding and that there is at least the potential for development of an
anticommons"). See also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds, 2001) (discussing the problem of
"patent thickets," which occurs when "an overlapping set of patent rights
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As to the concern that exempting research uses may decrease
the ability of the patent owner to profit off her invention, it is first
important to note that the reduction in revenues would not
necessarily be significant in every case. For instance, when the
relevant research tool is a product that is offered for sale through
an anonymous market transaction-as, for example, in the case of
patented chemical reagents sold via catalogues-researchers may
choose to purchase the tool rather than make it themselves.'"
Certain users may simply prefer to avoid the time and costs of
production or wish to obtain benefits of standardized production,"'
while others may choose to enjoy warranties and support and
maintenance services offered by the seller of the tool, when
relevant. In addition, certain patented inventions that serve as
research tools in individual cases may still have other non-
experimental uses that require a license even under a broad
experimental use exception.'32 Beyond that, even if some reduction
in the revenues for owners of patented research tools can be
expected because of the application of a broad experimental use
exception, it is not clear whether this would actually decrease the
incentives to develop new research tools to a sub-optimal level."'
Many research tools are invented by university or other non-profit
innovators, who are not motivated by the prospect of
commercializing the tools, but rather by their own needs as
requires that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain license from
multiple patentees").
130 In fact, with respect to such research tools that are readily available in the
market, the reasoning described above for the application of the experimental
use exception may not be applicable at all. For a detailed discussion, see Tur-
Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 757-58. In any event, even if the
experimental use exception covers such research tools, which means that users
are free to manufacture it on their own, many users may prefer to buy the tool
for the various reasons outlined in the text.
"3' See Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 181.
132 For example, some of the biomedical research tools listed in the text
accompanying supra note 119 have uses in medical treatment and diagnostics.
'3 See, e.g., Holzapfel & Sarnoff, supra note 29, at 181. See also supra notes
69-70 and accompanying text.
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researchers. 3 4 In other cases, non-market incentives for producing
research tools may exist, including government funding.'"
Furthermore, while under an exception covering experimental
use of research tools, the patent owner does not get compensated
for the mere research use of her invention, it may still be possible
to ensure her adequate compensation by allowing her to participate
in the profits made off the second-generation product. The
challenging aspect of this proposal is that a research tool is often
not embedded in the final version of such second-generation
product, albeit having been used in the process of its
development.' 6 Therefore, commercialization of the second-
generation product would not normally constitute an exploitation
of the original invention and, thus, would not require the consent
of the original patentee. Yet, this can be resolved by adjusting
patent scope rules, so that the exploitation of any invention
developed while using the patented invention would be considered
within the scope of the original patent.' Under such a rule, if the
134 See Strandburg, supra note 89, at 473-74 (arguing that in light of the
prevalence of user innovation of research tool inventions, "[r]esearchers would
very often continue to invent tools and methods for performing their own
research even if they could not prevent others from later using those
inventions") and 508 ("Many research tools are invented by non-profit
researcher innovators, such as university faculty, postdoctoral researchers, and
graduate students.").
135 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the
Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 813, 838 (2001) (noting that "even narrow patent rights on upstream
research may create sufficient incentives for producing this research, either
because the research is relatively inexpensive or because it is, at least in part,
publicly funded").
13 6 See HAROLD EINHORN & ERIC E. BENSEN, PATENT LICENSING
TRANSACTIONS (updated through October 2013), 6A-20 (noting that research
tools by definition form no part of the resulting product); Tur-Sinai, Cumulative
Innovation, supra note 37, at 732 (describing this feature as the defining
characteristic of the research tools scenario, as distinguished from other
cumulative innovation settings). But see SCOTCHMER, supra note 47, at 132
(demonstrating that some research tools may end up embodied in the second-
generation product).
1n For comparison, in copyright law, a "derivative work" is defined as any
"work based upon one or more preexisting works . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)
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research use results in the successful development of a commercial
product, the research user would have to request a license in order
to market such product, and the fees payable in return for such
license would serve as the means to pass a share of the profits to
the hands of the original patentee."' Undeniably, proving that the
follow-on product was developed by using the patented invention
may not be easy. But the difficulty of detecting and proving
infringement exists under the alternative no-experimental-use
regime as well.139 Notably, the difficulty to prove infringement
resulting from the hidden nature of the use exists, in general, in
connection with the broad category of process patents.140 One
mechanism that may mitigate this difficulty to some extent is the
application of a legal presumption of infringement in certain cases
where features of the final product or other circumstances indicate
a strong likelihood of use of the patented research tool.'4 '
In light of all the above, it seems that an application of the
experimental use exception to the research tools scenario is
something that should be given serious consideration by legal
systems. Embracing such legal regime may serve an important role
(emphasis added). For a suggestion to adopt such "Absolute Scope Principle,"
see Tur-Sinai, Cumulative Innovation, supra note 37, at 743.
In this context, it may be advisable to adopt liability rule doctrines-e.g., a
compulsory license regime-to be applied in case the parties fail to conclude a
voluntary agreement allowing for the commercial exploitation of the follow-on
product, while dividing the profit between the parties in a manner ensuring their
respective incentives. A detailed cost-benefit evaluation of such regime exceeds
the scope of this Article.
19 See EINHORN & BENSEN, supra note 136, at 6A-20 (noting that the owners
of research tool patents may find it hard to meet their burden of proving
infringement, as they typically have no ability to ascertain whether certain
research activities resulting in commercial products involved use of their
patents); Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 39, at 1071-72 ("Making and using a
patented invention within a research laboratory is not very conspicuous and thus
may never come to the attention of the patent holder."); Walsh et al., supra note
46, at 324 (noting that infringement of research tool patents is often hard to
detect).
140 See generally Alan Wright, The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and Process Patent Protection, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 603, 607 (1994)
(describing the inherent difficulty of proving infringement of a process patent).
141 Cf 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006) (a presumption to prove that a product was
made by a patented process).
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in preserving a proper balance between the rights of the patent
holder and the need to minimize the potential chilling effect of
patents on follow-on research and development. Certain patented
research tools constitute essential building blocks for further
developments in their respective technological fields, and the
importance of ensuring broad access to such tools is apparent.142
Indeed, a few countries, for example, Belgium'4 3 and Israel,'44
already employ a broad experimental use exception that
encompasses experiments with an invention.
Yet, this is clearly not a "one size fits all" solution. While a
meaningful experimental use exception must form an integral part
of each and every patent system, the applicability of such an
exception to the research tools scenario should ultimately be left to
the discretion of each country, as it chooses the particular point of
equilibrium amongst the competing considerations at stake. Such a
decision would also necessarily be dependent on other features of
the local patent system, including: (1) patentability requirements
that may affect the possibility of registering patents on research
tools in the first place;'45 (2) patent scope rules, which, directly
affect the possibility of the research tool patent owner to profit
from the markets for products developed while using the tool;'46
and (3) the availability of other means to incentivize development
of research tools, including direct governmental support for such
142 See, e.g., E. Richard Gold, Yann Joly & Timothy Caulfield, Genetic
Research Tools, the Research Exception and Open Science 3:2 GENEDIT 1, 1-2
(2005) ("Some of the most important genetic research tools are fundamental
research platforms that open up new and uncharted areas of investigation."). See
also Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 603-04
(2005) (noting the existence of patents that cover the building blocks of the
emerging field of nanotechnology).
143 Loi sur les brevets d'invention [Patent Act] du 28 mars 1984, Moniteur
Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], art. 28(1)(b). For commentary, see
generally Geertrui Van Overwalle & Esther van Zimmeren, Reshaping Belgian
Patent Law: The Revision of the Research Exemption and the Introduction of a
Compulsory License for Public Health, 64 IP FORUM 42 (2006).
144 Patents Law, 5727-1967, SH § 1 (Isr.).
145 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 135, at 838-44 (discussing the possibility of
keeping upstream research outside the bounds of patentability).
146 See discussion supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
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activity.'4 7 In respect to this particular question, then, a permissive
international regime delegating discretion to the member parties is
probably the most appropriate one.'48
However, the Experimental Use Clause, as currently drafted,
does not even refer to an exception covering the use of research
tools as an option. As stated above, the Experimental Use Clause
stipulates that each Party may exempt acts that are done "for
experimental purposes relating to the subject matter of a patented
invention."'4 9 Accordingly, an experimental use provision that
exempts experiments with patented inventions for the purpose of
developing a different invention is not covered by the
Experimental Use Clause. In theory, a member state could still
choose to adopt a broader experimental use exception under the
framework of Article E.5-the general authority to provide
exceptions to patent rights-provided that such exception meets
the general Three-Step Test restated therein.' Yet, the narrow
manner in which the Experimental Use Clause is currently drafted
may have a deterring effect on member parties that would consider
doing so. Indeed, in light of the fact that the Experimental Use
Clause is dedicated to experimental use of patents, one could
plausibly argue that in this particular domain, such specific clause
overrides the general authority to enact exceptions, and therefore,
any enactment or revision of an experimental use exception by a
member state must be made within its contours. As a result, rather
than encouraging member states to consider adopting broad
experimental use exceptions, the Experimental Use Clause may
actually have the opposite effect. In order to remedy this
147 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
148 Surely, even if the Experimental Use Clause as a whole is drafted in a
mandatory manner, this particular aspect may be left to the discretion of the
member parties.
149 The Experimental Use Clause goes on, in its second part, to state that
"experimental purposes may include, but need to be limited to" various acts,
including seeking an improvement of the invention. However, this "open list" is
merely an illustration of the general stipulation included in the first part of the
clause, and thus-cannot be used as the basis for enacting an experimental use
exception that deviates from such general stipulation. See IP Chapter, supra note
1, art. QQ.E.5ter.
5 0 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
100 [VOL. 16: 63
The Trans-Pacific Partnership
shortcoming, the Experimental Use Clause must be amended so
that it provides member states with discretion to enact exceptions
that cover experiments with patented inventions alongside
experiments relating to the subject matter of the invention."'
IV. CONCLUSION
The release of the draft IP Chapter of the TPP by WikiLeaks
provides a timely opportunity to review its content, as the TPP
negotiations advance.'52 This Article provided a critical analysis of
one clause that is included in the draft: The Experimental Use
Clause. As the analysis above shows, an experimental use
exception should be regarded as an essential component of every
patent system that seeks to mitigate the potential chilling effect of
patents on follow-on research and development. Yet, despite the
strong policy considerations supporting an experimental use
exception, it has not been adopted by all countries. Even among
the jurisdictions that employ such exception, there is no uniformity
regarding its scope and a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the
matter. Against this background, this Article highlights the
opportunity that the TPP presents, in its potential to facilitate the
adoption of broad experimental use exceptions by the member
states in order to create a global legal environment supportive of
cumulative research and development.
Yet, taking a close look at the actual text of the proposed
Experimental Use Clause reveals certain shortcomings in the way
it is currently drafted. First, by using permissive language, rather
than mandatory language, the Experimental Use Clause leaves the
matter to the discretion of the member parties. Without mandatory
restraints imposed by the international regime, the clause is not
15' Clearly, such exceptions would still need to meet the Three-Step Test. In
this particular context, in order to evaluate whether a specific exception is
legitimate, other features of the relevant patent system may need to be taken into
account. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., Solis, supra note 3, at I (noting that the talks have reached a
crucial phase); Joshua Rosenfield, Listen: Former Ambassador Urges U.S.
Action on TPP Negotiations (Feb. 27, 2014), available at http://asiasociety.org/blog/
asia/listen-former-ambassador-urges-us-action-tpp-negotiations (indicating that the
negotiations are in their final stretch).
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likely to have a significant weight in local policy discussions
regarding the matter. Second, the Experimental Use Clause does
not prescribe clear guidelines to the member parties regarding
various aspects related to the scope of the experimental use
exception. Most notably, it does not clarify whether the exception
may apply to experimental acts done for commercial purposes.
Finally, while allowing member nations to make an exception for
experimental acts relating to the subject matter of a patented
invention, the Experimental Use Clause fails to address
"experiments with an invention" aimed at developing a different
invention. The clause, thus, leaves outside of its permissive scope
important scenarios of cumulative innovation, including the use of
patented research tools in the process of developing a follow-on
invention.
The analysis made herein, thus, calls for an amendment of the
Experimental Use Clause. Ideally, the clause should mandate the
member nations to adopt an experimental use exception. However,
as explained above, this is not likely to happen. Assuming that the
Experimental Use Clause remains drafted in a permissive manner,
it should at least provide extensive guidance to the member parties
regarding the scope of the experimental use exceptions that may be
legitimately implemented. Among other things, the Experimental
Use Clause should clarify that a country may choose to adopt an
experimental use exception that applies in commercial settings as
well, and that such exception may cover experiments with an
invention and not only experiments on an invention, as long it
meets the Three-Step Test.
As noted above, including a detailed experimental use clause in
an international instrument governing the IP field is valuable not
only in itself, but also as a more general indication for a growing
commitment of the international community to user rights in patent
law. The rights-centric approach, which has dominated international
instruments in the IP field for many years, does not sufficiently
take into account existing practices and norms in various countries
and does not fit modem-day innovation landscape, where
innovation is often conducted in cumulative manner. In the context
of the TPP, as the current draft of the IP Chapter includes various
provisions that strengthen the rights of IP owners well beyond the
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standards reflected in existing international instruments, a properly
crafted Experimental Use Clause may serve a particularly
important balancing function.
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